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Abstract 
 
 
Ever since the beginnings of classical political economy in the early nineteenth 
century, economics has faced culturally based criticism from a long line of 
literary authors.  This paper argues that the old literary criticisms are still 
relevant and can provide useful guidelines for economic theory.  Their great 
merit is that they rest on the original definition of culture as a process, which 
avoids a static separation of structure and agency.  The same principle underlies 
some recent work in social theory and could be an important unifying theme for 
non-neoclassical economics.  A culturally informed institutional economics 
could build upon much that is valuable in existing institutional, post-Keynesian 
and Marxian approaches.  It would also be equipped to address cultural and 
interpretative questions beyond the ken of mainstream economics. 
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1.  Introduction 
 
Culture has always had an uneasy relationship with economics.  In mainstream economic 
theory the word 'culture' is seldom encountered, and mainstream economists never stray 
beyond core theoretical assumptions which eschew cultural ideas.  There may be a vague 
disapproval of culture as a dangerous, illiberal notion, but this remains implicit and culture 
is dealt with mainly by ignoring it.  Culture is mentioned in economic discussion 
principally by institutional economists, who make it a cornerstone of their critique of 
neoclassical theory.  It is also prevalent in social disciplines other than economics, 
especially sociology and social anthropology.  The example of institutional economics 
shows that culture need not conflict with economic theorising.  The real tension is between 
culture and the individualistic, reductionist slant of neoclassical economics. 
 
    Culture, a notoriously imprecise term, has many definitions (Kroeber and Kluckhohn, 
1952; Keesing, 1974; Williams, 1981).  Common to most of them is its role in linking the 
individual with society.  On some definitions it denotes the informing spirit of a society, the 
beliefs and values that represent the society's collective identity.  Other definitions regard it 
as part of a whole social order, including social institutions and technology as well as 
beliefs and values.  In both cases it is the means by which individuals become members of a 
society or social grouping.  Culture thus broaches one of the key questions in the social 
sciences, namely the interdependence of the individual and society.  Some commentators 
on culture have attempted to give it individualistic foundations and reduce it to fixed 
individual behaviour or preferences.  Individualism is inherent in Friedrich Hayek's 
'spontaneous order' (Hayek, 1982) and in some recent departures in social and economic 
anthropology (criticised by Anne Mayhew, 1987).  Conversely, culture can be depicted as 
structural, a form of social conditioning that dictates individual actions.  Views of this type 
occur, for instance, in functionalist and structuralist social theory.  Neither the 
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individualistic nor the structural accounts correspond to the original definition of culture.  
Originally, culture was defined as a process, that is, as the cultivation of individuals over 
time (Williams, 1976).  On this definition culture is not merely a reflection of given 
individual preferences or a static social structure; it is the moulding or creation of the 
individual agent within society.  Culture as a process avoids the dualism of individual 
agency and social structure.  A cultural perspective can counteract the dualisms that have 
marred theoretical work in the social sciences (Dow, 1990).  In its original definition as a 
process, culture yields a richer vision than the timeless and dualistic formulations of much 
subsequent theorising. 
 
    Critics of classical and neoclassical economics, from the late eighteenth century 
onwards, have invoked culture in all its definitions as a serious omission from economic 
modelling.  But with the arrival of specialised academic disciplines in the late nineteenth 
and early twentieth centuries, the emphasis switched from a historical approach to a 
timeless one, in other words, from 'culture' as a process to 'society' as a state.  Both 
approaches can supply effective criticism of mainstream economics, and the switch in 
emphasis does not mean harmony with mainstream economic theory: 'society' is the hub of 
the more 'social', less 'economic' social sciences.  A timeless, structural approach has 
weaknesses, however, in its preoccupation with the status quo and its understatement of 
creative activity and social change.  At its worst it spawns a structural reductionism which 
resembles in tone the individualistic reductionism of neoclassical economics.  The present 
paper argues that a movement back towards the older, cultural perspective can guard 
against the extremes of individualistic or structural reductionism and offer a better basis for 
non-neoclassical theorising.  Economists can still learn from their earliest critics. 
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2.  Culture 
 
The background to culture and its relationship with economics is described at length in 
Raymond Williams's Culture and Society (Williams, 1958), a work influential in the late 
1950s and 1960s and one of the founding texts of the British New Left.  Williams draws on 
literary sources from the late eighteenth century to the twentieth century and singles out a 
theme of cultural criticism of industrialism in general and of its rationalisation in economic 
and utilitarian theories.  Culture and Society is divided chronologically between the 
nineteenth and twentieth centuries; the sources from the twentieth century are more 
fragmented and constitute a less obvious body of criticism.  One reason for this is that, in 
the later nineteenth century, the informal social analysis and criticism undertaken by 
literary authors was formalised as the new academic social-science disciplines.  Cultural 
discussion was incorporated into the non-economic social sciences and, in economics, into 
institutionalism; other economists were formalising utilitarian doctrines as neoclassical 
economic theory, later to become present-day mainstream economics.  The new disciplines 
set a premium on 'objective', positive knowledge: for cultural discussion this implied an 
empirical bias, and a more theoretically manageable static method.  Greater formality 
brought loss of subtlety, and the earlier literary criticisms of economics have retained their 
bite.  Modern academic critics of mainstream economics refer to diverse literatures, yet 
they adhere mostly to academic work: less attention is paid to non-academic, literary 
writings.  The aim here is not to discuss the old cultural debates in detail, but to isolate 
points that are relevant to non-neoclassical economics. 
 
    While earlier sources exist (such as Giambattista Vico, 1725-44), culture is often traced 
back to the romanticism of late-eighteenth-century Germany.  Along with Vico, credit for 
first expounding the idea of culture is usually given to Johann Gottfried Herder (1784-91); 
the two authors are discussed by Isaiah Berlin (1976).  In romanticism, culture is a 
development of the individual by learning from the past.  Manifested through the 
individual, culture is tied inextricably to a community, as a collective patrimony, the 
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wisdom of earlier generations.  For knowledge and values to be handed on to new 
generations there must be socialisation of the individual.  Romanticism sees culture as more 
than social conditioning, however: culture enables the growth of the individual's capacities 
and enhances the scope for self-expression, creativity and free will.  The past proffers to the 
individual an opportunity for growth and improvement, not just a burden of constraints and 
inhibitions.  Culture both preserves inherited knowledge and fosters accumulation of new 
knowledge.  The romantic view of culture exerts relatively little influence today: it has the 
disadvantage of casting doubt on unhistorical, 'scientific' thinking, and has been tainted by 
an association with extreme nationalism and authoritarian collectivism.  Whatever its 
general merits, the romantic view has one valuable feature in its ambivalence to 
individualism and holism.  Romanticism can be either individualistic or holistic (Lukes, 
1973, Chapter 2), but it gives precedence to neither the individual nor the whole; both 
matter, so culture stands outside the dichotomy of individualism and holism.  The ability to 
reconcile the individual and society has eluded much economic theorising, and herein lies 
the significance of culture for economic theory. 
 
    Cultural criticism of economics dates from the very beginnings of economic theory.  The 
first cultural criticisms were made by English authors of the early nineteenth century, as a 
reaction to the Industrial Revolution and the laissez-faire doctrines of classical political 
economy.  Samuel Taylor Coleridge in particular was familiar with German philosophy and 
popularised the German idea of culture in the English language.  He drew the contrast 
between utilitarianism and a cultural outlook centred on 'cultivation' and 'enlargement', in 
which culture is vital to the maintenance of society and the realisation of an individual's 
potential (Coleridge, 1830).  The cultural ideal for Coleridge is the past, so his social 
analysis is conservative and matches in this respect the politics of Edmund Burke.  
Coleridge's proposals for a religious-cum-academic 'clerisy' may have little attraction 
today, but his criticisms of utilitarianism apply equally well to present-day mainstream 
economics.  The merits of Coleridge's social analysis were clearly perceived by John Stuart 
Mill, the inventor of 'economic man' (Mill, 1836).  Mill was acutely aware of the 
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drawbacks of the utilitarian model, as is evident from his essays on Bentham and Coleridge 
(Mill, 1838, 1840).  Although he remained on the utilitarian, 'economist's' side of the 
debate, he conceded the narrowness of utilitarianism and saw it as an abstract 
representation of only one facet of human behaviour.  In the essay on Coleridge he praised 
the insights of cultural and historical philosophies.  Mill never actually went further than a 
slight loosening of his individualism, but he was at least conversant with alternative views.  
Since Mill's time the utilitarian model has congealed into presuppositions which are rarely 
questioned or justified by mainstream economists. 
 
    A tradition of cultural criticism of classical political economy was built up throughout 
the nineteenth century, with contributions from many of the prominent authors of the 
period, among them Thomas Carlyle, Charles Dickens, Matthew Arnold, John Henry 
Newman, John Ruskin, and William Morris (Williams, 1958).  Of these, Arnold and 
Ruskin came closest to a deliberate critique of economic theory.  Arnold's Culture and 
Anarchy (Arnold, 1869) is the best-known version of the cultural arguments, although its 
influence on economists has been small.  In Arnold's view, laissez-faire leads to the loss of 
social cohesion and ultimately to anarchy.  The purpose of culture is partly to hold society 
together, partly to assist the development and fulfilment of the individual, which cannot be 
guaranteed under laissez-faire.  Education is the medium of cultural change and has the 
crucial function of connecting past and future; it perpetuates past knowledge and facilitates 
future additions to knowledge.  A well-established culture permits a critical faculty to be 
exercised: innovations, whether artistic or, more generally, social and economic, have to 
pass through criticism before they are accepted.  The problem with laissez-faire is that it 
rules out common critical values, and in so doing causes a drift towards anarchy and the 
debasement of the individual. 
 
    John Ruskin's view of political economy is set out in the four essays of Unto This Last 
(Ruskin, 1862).  For Ruskin, the main fault with classical economics was its estrangement 
from moral considerations.  The notion of economic man, though recognised by Mill and 
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others as an abstraction, connotes that self-interest combined with market transactions will 
bring about the greater good.  Ruskin argued that in practice economic behaviour is not 
purely self-interested and never can be, given that honour and truth telling underpin 
commercial transactions.  To rest one's theorising on pure self-interest is descriptively 
inaccurate and prescriptively undesirable.  A theory of the economy or society cannot rest 
on the individual alone, nor can a theory of value rest on individual self-interest.  Ruskin 
pointed out that the creation of wants through advertising and social pressures subverts the 
logic of the individualistic case for laissez-faire.  If the wants and desires of the individual 
are manipulated from above, then they cannot be sovereign in deciding what should be 
produced.  The 'science' of political economy, by eulogising self-interest, overlooks the 
social character of economic activity.  As soon as behaviour is socialised, morality enters 
the discussion; the working of markets is no longer mechanical and governed by 'natural' 
forces, but is subject to moral considerations.  Proper definitions of wealth and value 
should include a moral assessment of the ends of economic activity.  Unlike Arnold, 
Ruskin referred little to culture as such, but his writings on political economy fit closely 
into the cultural tradition.  Together, Arnold and Ruskin summarise the nineteenth-century 
cultural critique of classical political economy, although similar arguments were made by 
other authors. 
 
    Towards the end of the nineteenth century cultural criticism was out of step with the 
growth of specialised study in the new social sciences.  Some literary writers upheld the 
same cultural views, but their work was disparate: Williams in Culture and Society 
distinguishes nineteenth-century 'tradition' from twentieth-century 'opinions'.  Social 
analysis in the twentieth century is the allotted duty of the social sciences, which address in 
a more professional and scientific manner the issues previously addressed by literary 
amateurs.  Many of the ideas of the cultural tradition were adopted by the social-science 
disciplines, with changes of terminology and emphasis.  In economics, the cultural 
influence is confined to non-neoclassical theory, and as twentieth-century economic theory 
has been predominantly neoclassical the cultural arguments have been obscured.  In the 
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more 'social' social sciences, culture has entered the theoretical core of disciplines such as 
sociology and social anthropology.  But even there the more scientific emphasis distorted 
the messages of the cultural tradition. 
 
 
 
3.  Society 
 
Among the social sciences, sociology has the greatest need for general theorising about 
society and social action.  Any social theory has to confront the behaviour of individuals 
within society and take a position on the issues raised in the cultural criticisms of economic 
theory.  As one might expect, sociology has been less individualistic than economics.  The 
first sociology in the modern vein is ascribed to Émile Durkheim, who installed social 
structure as the centrepiece of sociological theorising (Durkheim, 1895); a stress on social 
structure has since become the hallmark of a sociological method.  The primacy of structure 
is most clearly displayed in structural-functionalism, which explains individual behaviour 
as fulfilling a function for society or social groups as a whole (Parsons, 1937; Merton, 
1957).  Functionalism understates individual agency through its 'top-down' perspective; it 
starts with the social structure and then reconciles individual actions with social ends.  The 
result can be criticised as too static and conservative, sanctioning any observed behaviour 
by deeming it necessary to the functioning of the social system.  In response to 
functionalism some sociologists dwell on the conflicts and tensions in a society, rather than 
its smooth functioning as a system (Dahrendorf, 1959).  Despite a larger capacity to model 
social change, a conflict view shares with functionalism a 'top-down' perspective; conflict is 
built into the social structure, even if it has no function in stabilising or perpetuating it.  
Sociology, to its credit, is pluralistic enough to embrace other, less structural theories: the 
interpretative sociology of Max Weber is an example (Weber, 1921).  To label sociology as 
putting structure before agency may be oversimplified, but the primacy of structure has 
nevertheless been the view of many sociologists and is frequently thought to distinguish 
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sociological theory: sociologists are 'structural' and proclaim the significance of society and 
social structure, whereas economists are 'individualistic' and base their theory on individual 
rationality.  The contrast caricatures both disciplines, yet it does contain some truth. 
 
    The rift between economics and sociology is illustrated by debates within social and 
economic anthropology.  Of all the formal academic disciplines, anthropology probably 
makes the most regular use of the word 'culture', defined not in the older, literary senses, 
but as a way of life to be studied by direct observation.  Thus interpreted, culture verges on 
the structural concepts of sociology, although anthropology is more empirically oriented 
and concentrates on concrete experience as opposed to theoretical abstraction.  Interest is 
chiefly in the observed manifestations of culture and the similarities and differences 
between societies.  Because the subject of study is present-day societies, anthropological 
theory is apt to be static and social, such that culture betokens social conditioning.  The 
accent on conditioning can be accused of denying individuality, and some anthropological 
writers have preferred individualistic, rational-choice methods (Mayhew, 1989).  
Individualism occurs especially in economic anthropology, where economic theory has its 
strongest influence.  The 'formalist' school follows neoclassical economics in identifying 
the interaction of rational individuals as the wellspring of economic organisation (Firth, 
1951; Herskovits, 1952; LeClair, 1962).  A more cultural approach is advocated by the 
'substantivist' school, which classes market relations as only one type of economic culture, 
in no sense a 'natural' outcome of human rationality (Polanyi, 1957; Dalton, 1961).  In these 
two schools of thought, economic anthropology mirrors the division between 'economic' 
and 'sociological' discourse.  The division could be overcome through the idea of culture as 
a process, but this is not how culture has generally been construed in anthropology. 
 
    Theory in the social sciences has proved susceptible to a polarisation of agency and 
structure, with one or the other declared as the prime mover of human behaviour.  Not all 
theory has followed this pattern, but theoretical attempts to interrelate agency and structure 
have been outside the mainstream of social-science disciplines.  Recent academic work 
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seeking to avoid an agency-structure dualism has come from three main sources.  The first 
is social theory, that is, general purpose theorising within sociology.  In the twentieth 
century the 'grand theory' on which sociology was founded has been replaced by 
specialisation and empiricism.  Some sociologists have persevered with general social 
theory, however, and have tried to transcend the rigid separation of agency and structure.  
Anthony Giddens's theory of 'structuration' is the foremost example.  Giddens steers clear 
of regarding structure solely as a constraint on individual behaviour and conflates agency 
and structure in a process of structuration (Giddens, 1984).  Structure is reproduced by 
individuals and enables the growth of individuals; they are neither wholly conditioned by 
the social environment nor wholly separate from it.  Individual agency and social structure 
are interdependent, and to give priority to one or the other in social theory would be 
misleading.  This recalls the romantic view of culture.  The plea for a more historical social 
theory and a fusing together of agency and structure is a revival of cultural ideas that 
predate sociology. 
 
    The second source of non-dualistic academic work is in formal cultural theory.  As an 
alternative to dualisms, some authors have proposed a cultural theory based on 'constrained 
diversity' (Douglas, 1982; Thompson et al., 1990).  The aim is to acknowledge that human 
behaviour is socially constructed, but according to a finite number of patterns.  In Mary 
Douglas's 'grid-group' model, a distinction is made between groups and networks as the two 
kinds of social relations; when combined, the group and network relations create five ways 
of life into which social behaviour can be classified.  Individuals and societies can shift 
between the ways of life, so the theory is more fluid than an agency-structure dualism.  The 
view of culture is not fully pluralistic.  Instead there is a constrained pluralism with an 
absolute, general framework, but one which is non-dualistic and sufficiently complex to 
embrace cultural diversity and change.  Other cultural theories are based on evolutionary 
modelling.  Biological models of evolution have been individualistic in spirit, because the 
Darwinian method of inheritance is the genetic endowment of the individual.  When 
applied to society, Darwinian models have engendered the individualistic philosophies of 
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Social Darwinism and, latterly, sociobiology.  A different evolutionary approach is to 
formulate models with a cultural (or Lamarckian) method of inheritance that involves the 
passing on of acquired characteristics.  In cultural theory the evolutionary arguments have 
been expressed mathematically as 'dual inheritance' models, which include both genetic and 
cultural evolution (Cavalli-Sforza and Feldman, 1981; Boyd and Richerson, 1985).  Dual 
inheritance models never play down culture and allow evolution to have the social 
dimension absent from sociobiology.  At a more specific level, institutional and 
evolutionary economists have indicated the importance of cultural evolution in preserving 
and transforming economic organisations (Nelson and Winter, 1982).  Cultural evolution is 
also prominent in Friedrich Hayek's recent social and economic writing (for example, 
Hayek, 1978, 1982).  The meaning of this work is somewhat ambiguous, and its appeal to 
culture and group competition seems inconsistent with Hayek's individualistic 
pronouncements (Vanberg, 1986; Hodgson, 1991).  Cultural theory should ideally be 
non-dualistic and non-reductionist. 
 
    The third source of non-dualistic academic work is from authors in the Marxian tradition.  
Following Marx, much Marxian work is interdisciplinary and difficult to categorise within 
conventional disciplinary boundaries; it is sufficiently broad to encompass different views 
of agency and structure.  In Karl Marx's own writings different views of agency and 
structure can be discerned: the early Marx showed concern for individual agency and 
self-development (Marx, 1844); later writings set up the materialist base-superstructure 
model, which has a more structural flavour (Marx, 1859).  The base-superstructure analogy 
can encourage a reduction of behaviour down to an economic definition of structure 
('economism' in Antonio Gramsci's terminology).  Some postwar Marxian authors, notably 
Louis Althusser, have espoused a full-blooded structuralism that all but emasculates 
individual agency (Thompson, 1978).  It remains possible, though, to blend orthodox 
Marxism with a less stringent attitude to agency and structure (Callinicos, 1987); 
unorthodox Marxian writers have long been sceptical of the base-superstructure model 
(Bottomore, 1984).  The case for a cultural approach was made by the original British New 
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Left in the 1950s, as a middle path between the individualism of western ideology and the 
collectivism of the east.  Similar views have been voiced in more technical and 
philosophical language by Continental Marxist authors, in particular Gramsci and the 
Frankfurt School.  The New Left position suggests a culturally based social theorising 
which circumvents the problems of an excessively individualistic or structural method. 
 
    Mainstream theorising in the social sciences has hardened social analysis into an 
unhistorical image of society, in place of the earlier historical idea of culture.  The desire 
for a more human, less mechanical imagery goes back to Samuel Taylor Coleridge and the 
first cultural critics of classical economics; it is equally germane as criticism of neoclassical 
economics and of much theorising in sociology and the non-economic social sciences.  
Although not always explicitly mentioned, culture is a unifying theme for many critiques of 
mainstream social theory by sociologists, cultural theorists and Marxian writers.  In 
economics it can be a unifying theme for non-neoclassical alternatives to the neoclassical 
mainstream. 
 
 
 
4.  Economic theory 
 
By the unqualified term 'economic theory' economists normally have in mind a particular 
theory derived from the neoclassical economics of the late nineteenth century.  The 
neoclassical roots of modern mainstream theory are apparent in three features: an 
individualistic method; instrumental, means-ends rationality; and market equilibrium, 
attained through the interactions of rational agents subject to income or resource 
constraints.  Under these conditions equilibrium has the property of Pareto efficiency, 
which underlies the conventional theoretical case for markets.  Some authors have claimed 
that the 'economic approach' (that is to say, neoclassicism) can go outside the standard 
subject matter of economics to illuminate the domains of the other social sciences (Becker, 
 - 12 - 
 
1976; Hirshleifer, 1985).  Mainstream economics is an adulterated form of neoclassicism, 
in that it has additional constraints and imperfections which are not reduced to individual 
behaviour and may disturb or prevent the attainment of efficient market equilibrium.  
Whether this is distinct from neoclassical theory is debatable; it is not by and large 
presented as a distinct theory; it lacks an identity and even a name (other than 'mainstream 
economics' or, in macroeconomics, the 'neoclassical synthesis').  Its critics call it 
'imperfectionism', since the characterisation of constraints as imperfections implies that the 
removal of the constraints would restore the efficiency of market equilibrium (Eatwell and 
Milgate, 1982).  Reached or not, equilibrium is a ubiquitous benchmark with which the 
current state of the economy is compared.  Mainstream economics is preoccupied with 
divergences from equilibrium, which never go quite far enough to bring about a truly 
different theoretical method. 
 
    If the constrained optimisation techniques of mainstream economics were decoupled 
from market equilibrium and income constraints, then they could become a species of 
institutional economics: individual decisions would be modelled by rational, optimising 
behaviour, structural influences by the income and non-income constraints on behaviour.  
The outcome would be a mathematical formalisation of the view that irreducible social 
structures constrain the individual.  In some ways such an approach would improve on 
conventional neoclassical theory: for example, in the recognition of the place of structure 
and in the resultant downgrading of income and relative prices.  The trouble with 
neoclassical theory goes deeper than this, however, and carries over to an augmented, 
structurally constrained version of neoclassicism.  Problems abound in the treatment of 
both agency and structure.  On the agency side it is doubtful whether instrumental 
rationality counts as individual agency.  The theory is certainly individualistic and gives 
little credence to socialised behaviour, but its instrumentalism summons up a vision of the 
individual responding robotically to external stimuli; this may not be agency, if by agency 
is meant free will (Shackle, 1969; Loasby, 1976; de Uriarte, 1990).  As for structure, the 
constrained optimisation model epitomises the static depiction of structure as a constraint.  
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It is therefore vulnerable to all of the cultural arguments about the creation of the individual 
agent in society.  Even when structure is on a more even footing with agency, a neoclassical 
approach can yield only a mechanical portrayal of behaviour. 
 
    The existing alternatives to neoclassical theory are conscious of cultural and historical 
issues, although the bond with the cultural tradition and with work in the other social 
sciences is not as strong as it might be.  The common ground between non-neoclassical 
economics and the 'anti-economic' cultural tradition could help to strengthen and unite the 
various branches of non-neoclassical theory.  To be consonant with culture, a theory must 
avoid reductionism and be capable of modelling historical change.  Three main branches of 
non-neoclassical theory can satisfy these requirements: Marxian, post-Keynesian and 
institutional economics.  Other non-neoclassical views are less amenable, in particular 
Austrian economics, which persists in individualism.  The cultural and historical aspects of 
Marxian thought have already been alluded to in the previous section.  Keynesian 
economics has many strands, some of which have sought a synthesis with neoclassical 
theory.  John Maynard Keynes himself wanted a clean break with neoclassical economics, 
notwithstanding his retention of neoclassical concepts in the General Theory (Keynes, 
1936, Chapter 2).  It has been claimed that Keynes turned away from scientific, 
Enlightenment philosophy, to return to a pre-Enlightenment philosophy inspired by 
Platonism and the politics of Edmund Burke (Fitzgibbons, 1988).  Economics is then a 
moral science, which permits the 'unscientific' practices of introspection and judgements of 
value.  This puts Keynes nearer to the cultural tradition with its distrust of the crude 
extensions of Enlightenment philosophy to the study of human societies.  Through the 
transmission of values to future generations culture has moral content, as does the study of 
culture.  Keynes's belief in the moral character of economics sits more comfortably with 
cultural theorising than with mainstream economics.  Another component of Keynes's 
economics, to the fore in much post-Keynesian work, is historical time (Robinson, 1979).  
Here again Keynes has an affinity with the cultural tradition, which is profoundly historical 
and vehemently opposed to unhistorical concepts such as universal social structures or 
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human nature.  One neoclassical habit retained by Keynes was a neglect of social 
institutions.  Keynes took little notice of institutional economics and was hostile to Marxian 
thought: his reluctance to move to a less individualistic view stimulated the later syntheses 
of Keynesian economics with neoclassicism.  But post-Keynesian economics is receptive to 
non-neoclassical behavioural foundations, which can distance it from mainstream 
economics.  There is no obstacle to assimilating post-Keynesian economics with a cultural 
perspective. 
 
    Of the varieties of non-neoclassical theory, institutional economics is the most culturally 
inclined.  It respects the specificity of economic arrangements and resists the temptation to 
formulate universal theories.  Institutionalism has at times seemed an anti-theoretical 
doctrine that restricts itself to case studies and empirical observation.  A self-imposed 
restriction of this sort is damaging to non-neoclassical economics and gives the impression 
that neoclassicism is the only theoretical possibility in economics.  Without denying 
historical specificity or the value of empirical work, institutionalism needs to be grounded 
in theory distinct from mainstream economics.  A distinction could be made through an 
exclusively structural approach, at the risk of underestimating individual agency.  A more 
satisfactory theoretical grounding would be obtainable from a cultural and historical 
approach that bridges the agency-structure gap.  As long as institutionalism can 
accommodate cultural evolution and the growth of the individual agent within society, it 
can be envisaged as a cultural method.  Some recent brands of institutionalism are at odds 
with cultural ideas: this is true, in particular, of the 'new institutionalism', if it pursues the 
reductionist objective of explaining institutions as the product of rational individual 
behaviour (Rutherford, 1989).  A different stance has been taken by Geoffrey Hodgson 
(1988, 1989), who calls for a modern, non-reductionist institutional economics and thus, 
implicitly, for a more cultural perspective.  John Foster (1987) likewise calls for an 
evolutionary macroeconomics that emphasises creativity and 'macro-consciousness'; these 
seem to be cultural ideas, but without mentioning culture.  A broadly based institutional 
economics, on the lines described in Hodgson (1988), provides the best chance of 
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introducing cultural issues into economics.  It would be desirable, however, for such work 
to follow in the cultural tradition, which in its criticism of economic theory long preceded 
institutionalism. 
 
    What, then, are the implications of culture for economic theorising?  If theory is to be 
compatible with culture as a process, it has to assent to the formation of the individual 
agent in society.  There can be no universal human nature determining social outcomes, nor 
can there be universal social structures determining human actions.  Culture jars with 
individualistic or structural reductionism, but not with theory itself, even if cultural ideas 
are sometimes said to be inimical to theory or generalisation (Rousseas, 1989).  The point is 
simply that there can be no single, closed, all-embracing reductionist theory or system that 
covers all times and places.  In one sense this makes theorising easier, by relieving it of the 
job of trying to discover or preserve such a system.  The theorist can no longer be forced to 
work within a single, 'legitimate' system that defines the discipline and hampers creativity.  
From a cultural perspective, the ad hoc modelling disdained by mainstream economics is a 
harmless tailoring of theory to circumstances: theory will never be utterly general, so it 
should not be attacked for failing to reduce behaviour to fundamentals.  In another sense 
theorising becomes more difficult.  The reality of human society does not fit a single model 
because of its complexity, and theorists must struggle to depict some salient features of this 
reality.  A doctrinal orthodoxy may hamper creativity, but it is a refuge for convergent 
thought that welcomes reductionism and has no wish to be liberated.  Convergent thought 
would be less prominent in a cultural approach.  Its exponents could still make a 
contribution, but in the company of other, more creative theorists and never with the 
assurance that their favoured theory stands alone and unchallenged. 
 
    Alongside greater diversity of theory, a cultural perspective should also bring greater 
diversity of method.  Cultural thought started with the 'Counter-Enlightenment', the reaction 
against the Enlightenment's attitude to human society (Berlin, 1981).  As humans are 
self-conscious, sentient beings, social studies were felt to be different from the natural 
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sciences and to require different methods.  The lynchpin of the debate was the fruitfulness 
of efforts by scholars to interpret or understand human behaviour.  Giambattista Vico's New 
Science was intended to supplant the 'scientific' methods of the Enlightenment as an 
approach to social studies: at its heart was an 'understanding' of human agents.  Similar 
methods were propounded by the German cultural tradition, in Johann Gottfried Herder's 
notion of Einfühlung, in the Verstehen doctrine of Wilhelm Dilthey and Max Weber, and in 
hermeneutic philosophy.  Virtually all social theorising makes conscious or unconscious 
use of interpretation, yet mainstream economics has steered economists away from 
conscious efforts to interpret behaviour.  Openly interpretative methods have been confined 
to sections of the Austrian school, where they are allied with individualism (Lachmann, 
1986).  Interpretative methods are not necessarily individualistic, however, provided that 
they leave room for social context; Austrian economics divorces understanding from its 
relation with culture.  In a more cultural approach to economics, theorists may have to 
interpret the behaviour of agents who are themselves floundering to comprehend reality and 
perhaps holding versions of the theorist's own models.  Anthony Giddens (1984) terms this 
the 'double hermeneutic', the two-way interpretation that marks all social science.  
Mainstream economics has only one level: the theory.  No distinction is made between 
reality, the agent's culture-bound view of reality, the theorist's interpretation of the agent's 
view of reality, and so forth.  Curiously enough, 'new classical' macroeconomics has 
stumbled on the insight that agents have a model of reality, and Giddens (1987) gives it due 
credit.  The insight is wasted, because agents are assumed to have the right model, which is, 
of course, neoclassical, collapsing everything back on to the usual neoclassical plane.  The 
acceptance that people have culturally specific beliefs and values is missing from 
mainstream economic theory, as is the associated problem of how the theorist should cope 
with them.  There is nothing special about economic behaviour to justify this.  It arises 
from the way that the economics profession has evolved, as a culture that asserts the 
unimportance of culture.  Working in such an environment, economists rarely display what 
Charles Wright Mills (1959) called the 'sociological imagination', a sensitivity to the place 
of the individual agent in society.  Any economist who stays with the mainstream will 
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never touch on the many cultural issues that pertain to economics and are, at present, 
treated primarily by authors in other social disciplines. 
 
    A more cultural perspective in economics would open up the methods available to 
investigators, rather than replacing one method by another.  The result would not be an 
'anything goes' anarchy or an anti-naturalistic rejection of the possibility of social science.  
Culture and hermeneutics can be integrated into a consistent philosophy of social science, 
as realist authors have argued (Keat and Urry, 1975; Bhaskar, 1979; Outhwaite, 1987).  
What should result is a critical or constrained form of pluralism, which is awake to the 
complexity of human societies and tolerates different methods and theories, without 
abandoning the quest for absolute standards.  Social science must not only interpret and 
understand the beliefs held in society, but criticise and, if necessary, correct them.  
Criticism should also extend to the internal practices of the social sciences, which would 
entail a 'critical pluralism' of method (Caldwell, 1989).  While social or economic theorists 
can never stand completely apart from social and cultural pressures, they should 
nevertheless strive for a critical position that sheds light on reality. 
 
 
 
5.  Conclusion 
 
Culture and economics are not mutually exclusive, in spite of their customary separation.  If 
all human behaviour is at least partially culture-specific, then economic behaviour is no 
exception and a more cultural approach to economic theory would be appropriate.  This is 
tacitly admitted when terms such as 'enterprise culture' and 'dependency culture' appear in 
economic discussion, although they hardly ever encroach on theoretical terrain.  The 
sealing off of economic theory from culture can only be detrimental.  Economics should 
heed the long-standing criticisms from outside the discipline and adapt in a cultural 
direction. 
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    The prospects for a more culturally informed economics lie with non-neoclassical 
economists.  Most are only too aware of the limitations of neoclassical theory, but there 
seems to be less awareness that the objections to mainstream theory stem largely from 
cultural criticisms.  The tendency is to speak more often of history or evolution than of 
culture, and little is made of the close relation between historical, evolutionary and cultural 
methods.  Economists may have inherited from classical economics a lingering unease 
about culture, which has been confirmed by the misuse of culture in practice for 
authoritarian purposes.  Culture can certainly be misused, but in its origins it was meant to 
be a pluralistic concept attuned to the diversity of human societies.  In academic work, 
cultural ideas should be liberating and expansive; they should evoke suspicion of dogma 
and alertness to the connections between academic disciplines.  Non-neoclassical 
economists would do well to note the cultural criticisms of mainstream theory and set aside 
any aspirations to replace it with another self-contained economic orthodoxy.  Economics 
should be a genuine social discipline, culturally informed, pluralistic in its methods, and 
differentiated from other social disciplines only by it subject matter. 
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